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MEASURING CIRCUIT SPLITS: A CAUTIONARY NOTE 
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl 
Reprinted from 4 JOURNAL OF LAW (3 JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL METRICS) 361 (2014) 
Abstract:  
A number of researchers have recently published new measures of the 
Supreme Court’s behavior in resolving conflicts in the lower courts. 
These new measures represent an improvement over prior, cruder 
approaches, but it turns out that measuring the Court’s resolutions of 
conflicts is surprisingly difficult. The aim of this methodological 
comment is to describe those difficulties and to establish several 
conclusions that follow from them. First, the new measures of the 
Court’s behavior are certainly imprecise and may reflect biased samples. 
Second, using the Supreme Court Database, which some studies rely on 
to assemble a dataset of cases resolving conflicts, exacerbates the 
problems. Third, real precision may be infeasible given the nature of the 
enterprise. 
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INTRODUCTION"
ircuit splits and other divisions of authority in the lower 
courts are interesting and important for a number of reasons, 
perhaps most of all because a split of authority is probably 
the single most important factor in triggering Supreme Court review.1 
Although the study of such conflicts is not new, the topic holds re-
newed interest because scholars have begun publishing improved 
measures of the Court’s behavior in resolving conflicts. The simple 
observation that the Supreme Court reverses much more often than 
it affirms – it has reversed about 70-75% of the decisions it has re-
viewed, in recent years2 – actually tells us very little about how well 
the lower courts fare on review. That is because any particular lower-
court decision reviewed by the Supreme Court is usually just one of 
several conflicting decisions to have addressed the legal question at 
issue. Therefore, even when the Court reverses the decision directly 
under review, the Court might be indirectly “affirming” several other 
lower courts.  
A more meaningful measure of the Court’s supervision of the 
lower courts would take this fact of indirect or “parallel” review into 
account, and that is exactly what several recently published studies 
                                                                                                 
† Associate Professor and George Butler Research Professor, University of Houston Law 
Center. I thank Adam Aft, Tom Cummins, Eric Hansford, Arthur Hellman, Dru Steven-
son, and Stephen Wasby for helpful comments. I thank Kirsty Davis for research assistance. 
1 See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 246 (1994) (“Without a doubt, the single 
most important generalizable factor in assessing certworthiness is the existence of a conflict 
or ‘split’ in the circuits.”). 
2 See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 271 (5th ed. 2012). 
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aim to do.3 As one of those studies, published in this Journal, states, 
“[o]nce data regarding decisions on parallel review are added to the 
decisions on primary review, a more accurate – and much different – 
view of federal appellate court performance emerges.”4 Although the 
figures reported in these studies differ depending on the precise 
methods and time periods involved, the findings show the Supreme 
Court agreeing with the lower courts much more often than one 
would gather from the crude information provided by primary re-
versal rates. 
These new measures improve our understanding of the relation-
ship between the lower courts and the Supreme Court, but we should 
understand these measures’ limits. Providing an accurate accounting 
of the Supreme Court’s treatment of lower courts requires that the 
researcher define which categories of the Court’s cases should be 
studied, identify those cases on the Court’s docket, and then deter-
mine which lower courts are indirectly affirmed or reversed in each 
of those cases. These tasks turn out to be surprisingly difficult. 
The main purpose of this comment is to explain why those tasks 
are difficult and how the difficulties mar the resulting measurements. 
Once the difficulties are fully appreciated, researchers can and 
should adjust their aims, methods, and reporting so as to improve 
accuracy and reduce the risk of misstatement. But to some degree 
the culprit is the Supreme Court’s own practices – practices that 
impede precise measurement and, more worryingly, may introduce 
systematic bias into researchers’ findings. A secondary goal of this 
comment is to highlight the limitations of the Supreme Court Data-
base as a tool for identifying Supreme Court cases resolving splits, 
                                                                                                 
3 See, e.g., Tom Cummins & Adam Aft, Appellate Review, 2 J.L. (1 J. LEGAL METRICS) 59 (2012) 
[hereinafter App. Rev. I]; Tom Cummins & Adam Aft, Appellate Review II – October Term 2011, 
3 J.L. (2 J. LEGAL METRICS) 37 (2013) [hereinafter App. Rev. II]; Eric Hansford, Measuring 
the Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split Resolutions, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1145 (2011); John S. 
Summers & Michael J. Newman, Towards a Better Measure and Understanding of U.S. Supreme 
Court Review of Courts of Appeals Decisions, 80 U.S.L.W. 393 (2011). Hansford’s study had 
the broader goal of determining whether circuits fare better in the Supreme Court in fields 
in which they have expertise, but answering that question required him first to compile 
(like the other studies above) a more complete measure of circuit performance. 
4 App. Rev. I, supra note 3, at 62. 
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whether for purposes of constructing measures of reversal rates or 
for other purposes that may be of interest to lawyers and political 
scientists.  
I.!"
BRIEF%OVERVIEW&OF&"
PARALLEL%REVIEW%AND%ITS#USES"
efore delving into the difficulties, we should begin by briefly 
introducing the idea of parallel review and its many uses. The 
basic idea is simple but powerful. Consider a hypothetical Supreme 
Court that resolves three cases, one each from the Sixth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits. The Supreme Court affirms in the case from the 
Seventh Circuit and reverses in the other two, which yields a reversal 
rate of 67%. In truth, however, the Supreme Court has reviewed 
not just three decisions but several times that number, because each 
of those three cases presented legal questions that had divided the 
lower courts for years. Suppose the legal question in each case can 
be represented as a binary choice between two options such as X or 
not-X (e.g., a limitations period is subject to equitable tolling or is 
not, the “search incident to arrest” doctrine applies to smartphones or 
does not). A more complete picture of the Court’s appellate reversal 
rates would then look like this: 
 
Case 1 (X or not-X) Case 2 (Y or not-Y) Case 3 (Z or not-Z) 
Overall 
reversal rate 
Circuit positions on 
the question  
X: 
1st, 2d, 
9th, DC 
Not-X: 
3d, 6th 
Y: 
7th, 5th, 
10th 
Not-Y: 
2d, 6th, 
DC 
Z: 
4th, 10th 
Not-Z: 
5th, 9th, 
8th, 11th 
 
Circuit directly 
reviewed by S. Ct. 
6th 7th 9th  
S. Ct. ruling X Y Z  
S. Ct. disposition 
on direct review 
reversed 6th Cir. affirmed 7th Cir. reversed 9th Cir. 67% (2 of 3) 
Reversal rate incl. 
parallel review 
33% (2 of 6) 50% (3 of 6) 67% (4 of 6) 50% (9 of 
18) 
B 
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A few important differences between direct and parallel review 
now become apparent. For one, the full measure of the Supreme 
Court’s reversal rate can differ significantly from the rate on direct 
review. The figures in this hypothetical – 50% versus 67% – are 
broadly reflective of the findings of the recent studies, which show 
that lower courts fare much better once parallel review is consid-
ered.5 Moreover, accounting for parallel review can alter which 
lower courts appear best and worst. In this hypothetical, the Ninth 
Circuit was reversed 100% of the time on direct review (one rever-
sal out of one opportunity in Case 3), but it was indirectly affirmed 
in Case 1, so perhaps it is not performing badly after all. And the 
“best” performance – two wins and no losses for the 10th Circuit – 
came from a court that was not directly reviewed at all. 
The concept of parallel review has many uses. The Cum-
mins/Aft and Summers/Newman studies are primarily aimed at 
measuring parallel review rates and using them to produce better 
assessments of circuit performance,6 a matter of keen interest to 
observers of the courts. One could also use this comprehensive 
measure as one step toward answering more complex research 
questions. For example, if one wants to know whether courts with 
greater experience in a field (say, the Second Circuit in securities 
litigation) perform better than non-expert courts, one might con-
sider how often the Supreme Court adopts the view of that expert 
lower court – and in doing so one would probably want to include 
cases in which the expert court’s rule came up to the Supreme 
Court indirectly via a different lower court’s decision.7 Similarly, if 
a researcher wants to know whether the Supreme Court is influ-
enced or constrained by the rulings of the lower courts, parallel re-
                                                                                                 
5 See App. Rev. II, supra note 3, at 37-38; Summers & Newman, supra note 3, at 3.  
6 See App. Rev. I, supra note 3, at 59-60; Summers & Newman, supra note 3, at 1-2. For 
earlier studies using similar methods and pursuing similar goals, though with a focus on the 
Ninth Circuit in particular, see Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme 
Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 412-15 (1998); and Stephen 
L. Wasby, How the Ninth Circuit Fares in the Supreme Court: The Intercircuit Conflict Cases, 1 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 119 (2005).  
7 This, in essence, is the question studied in Hansford, supra note 3.  
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view is much more informative than direct review.8 Indeed, a meas-
ure of reversal rates that incorporates parallel review is probably the 
more appropriate measure for most research questions.  
But whatever use one wants to make of parallel review, one has 
to proceed carefully. One first has to identify the set of Supreme 
Court cases one wants to study, which presents both definitional 
questions as well as practical problems. Then, having defined and 
identified the relevant Supreme Court cases, one has to determine 
which lower courts were involved and what the Court did with all 
of them. Those tasks are harder than they might seem, in part be-
cause the Court is, alas, not as attuned to the needs of empirical re-
searchers as one might wish.  
II.!"
COMPLEXITIES*OF*IDENTIFYING)SPLITS"
A. Defining the Cases of Interest 
n initial question that confronts the researcher, though ulti-
mately not one of the more complicated questions, is how to 
define the category of Supreme Court cases one wishes to study. 
Any study of parallel review will, obviously, include those cases 
involving conflicts in the lower courts. At the other end of the spec-
trum from the conflicts are the cases involving issues that one and 
only one lower court has addressed, such as because one lower 
court has exclusive jurisdiction over the topic (as in some areas of 
patent law and administrative law, for example) or because the 
question is so fact-bound that it does not present any generalizable 
issue of law. An additional, intermediate category is composed of 
cases in which multiple lower courts have addressed a question, all 
of them have agreed, and the Supreme Court affirms or reverses all 
                                                                                                 
8 This is one of the questions addressed in Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court 
Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851 (2014). Lindquist and Klein address similar questions in a 
2006 article, in which they treated the majority view in the lower courts largely as a proxy 
for legal correctness, the influence of which they compared to other potential influences 
like ideology. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential 
Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
135, 141-42 (2006). 
A 
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of them.9 The existence of these various categories raises the ques-
tion of what one means by “conflicts” and, more broadly, the ques-
tion of why one might want to study conflicts-so-defined instead of 
a broader or narrower range of cases.10 Some or all of the non-splits 
could be ignored if one is interested in the Court’s resolution of 
lower-court conflicts per se, but it is not so clear that one should ig-
nore them – especially the non-splits involving the unanimous views 
of multiple lower courts – if one is interested in understanding how 
the Supreme Court relates to the lower courts, how often it agrees 
with them, how well the lower courts are performing, etc. Further 
complications concern whether to study all lower courts or only 
some of them (most notably the federal courts of appeals) and 
whether to include the Supreme Court’s summary dispositions as 
well as fully argued cases. In any event, the decision to include and 
exclude certain categories of cases should be acknowledged and then 
supported by some reason rooted in the research question.  
B. Undercounting of Splits in the Supreme Court Database 
Let us assume that the category of cases to be studied either in-
cludes, or is entirely limited to, Supreme Court cases resolving con-
flicts in the lower courts. There next arises the deceptively difficult 
problem of finding those cases. One approach, employed by some 
researchers in the field, is to locate conflicts by relying on the re-
nowned Supreme Court Database (“the Database”) maintained by 
Harold Spaeth and his collaborators.11 Among the dozens of pieces of 
                                                                                                 
9 See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1133-35 (2011) 
(noting that several lower courts had ruled a particular way and reversing them all); Cole-
man v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S. Ct 1327, 1332 (2012) (affirming every court 
of appeals to have addressed the question); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 
(2011) (observing that the lower courts were in accord on one issue in the case and affirm-
ing them all). In the cases just cited, I rely on the Supreme Court’s representations that the 
lower courts were unanimous. 
10 Summers and Newman acknowledge the issue and report reversal rates for different 
categories of cases, which is helpful. See Summers & Newman, supra note 3, at 3. 
11 SUPREME COURT DATABASE, scdb.wustl.edu/index.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). The 
initial iterations of the Cummins/Aft studies of parallel review relied primarily on the Su-
preme Court Database to identify cases. See App. Rev. I, supra note 3, at 64. Other research-
ers, especially in political science, have relied on the Database to locate splits for purposes 
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information collected about each case, the Database includes a vari-
able for “certReason”: the reason, as reported by the Court’s opin-
ion, that the Court granted certiorari. That variable can take on a 
number of different values, including several corresponding to dif-
ferent types of splits (splits between different federal courts, splits 
between federal and state courts, confusion in the lower courts, 
etc.).12 Someone looking at the Database’s split-related coding 
would probably realize, if he or she gave the matter some thought, 
that those codes would not capture cases where there was no divi-
sion in the lower courts, even if multiple lower courts had ruled on 
the question. But one might at least assume that one could use the 
split-related values for the “certReason” variable to identify Su-
preme Court cases resolving splits. And yet that assumption may be 
perilous. 
Relying on the Database’s coding to identify the universe of 
splits causes undercounting and a serious risk of bias. Some initial 
hint of the problem is apparent if one compares the number of cases 
in which the Database shows the reason for the grant of certiorari as 
split-related to the total number of cases in the Database for the 
same year, as follows: 
2010 Term:  25 coded splits out of 85 cases (29.4%) 
2011 Term:  22 coded splits out of 77 cases (28.6%) 
2012 Term:  32 coded splits out of 79 cases (40.5%) 
2013 Term: 24 coded splits out of 75 cases (32.0%)13  
These figures would strike most observers as low, given the widely 
shared understanding that a majority of the Supreme Court’s docket 
is composed of cases in which the lower courts have divided.14  
                                                                                                 
besides compiling rates of reversal on parallel review. See infra note 21 (citing examples). 
12 See Harold Spaeth et al., Supreme Court Database Code Book 35, 95 (July 23, 2014), SU-
PREME COURT DATABASE, scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?s=2. 
13 These figures reflect the sum of “certReason” variable codes 2 through 9, which involve 
various types of splits or confusion in the lower courts. These figures come from the fol-
lowing version of the database: 2014 Release 01, Case-centered/Citation-organized dataset (July 
23, 2014), SUPREME COURT DATABASE, scdb.wustl.edu/data.php. 
14 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
517, 521 (2003) (“Currently, about 70 percent of the cases we agree to hear involve deep 
divisions of opinion among federal courts of appeals or state high courts.”); David R. Stras, 
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Part of the explanation for these low figures (though, as we will 
see, only one part) is that the Database’s “certReason” variable is 
coded in a precise, narrow way. Based on my observations of how 
the coding protocol is applied, the Database does not show a case as 
involving a split unless the Supreme Court’s lead opinion describes 
that as the reason for granting certiorari, even when the Court reveals the 
division of authority near the mention of the grant. If the opinion of the 
Court says, “We granted certiorari in order to resolve a conflict in 
the circuits concerning X,” that will count. But here are a few ex-
amples from recent years of cases that were not coded as splits: 
• Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, Cal.,15 coded as “no reason 
given”: 
We granted certiorari[FN3] and now reverse the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s judgment. 
[FN3]: U.S. Courts of Appeals have divided on the cir-
cumstances under which suits may be brought by alleged 
third-party beneficiaries of Government contracts. [Several 
citations provided.] 
• CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dep’t of Revenue,16 coded as 
“no reason given”: 
CSX petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Elev-
enth Circuit had misunderstood ACF Industries and noting a split 
of authority concerning whether railroads may bring a challenge 
under § 11501(b)(4) to non-property taxes from which their 
competitors are exempt.[FN4] We granted certiorari and now 
reverse. 
[FN4]: [Many citations provided.] 
• Gonzalez v. Thaler,17 coded by the Database as granted “to resolve 
the question presented”: 
                                                                                                 
The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
947, 981 (2007) (concluding that approximately 70% of the Supreme Court’s cases from 
2003-2005 involved splits in the lower courts). 
15 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1347 (2011) (citation omitted). 
16 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1106-07 (2011) (citation omitted). 
17 132 S. Ct. 641, 647 (2012).  
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We granted certiorari to decide two questions, both of which 
implicate splits in authority: (1) whether the Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction to adjudicate Gonzalez’s appeal, notwithstand-
ing the § 2253(c)(3) defect;[FN1] and (2) whether Gonzalez’s 
habeas petition was time barred under § 2244(d)(1) due to the 
date on which his judgment became final.[FN2] 
[FN1]: The Circuits have divided over whether a defect in a 
COA is a jurisdictional bar. [Citations to several cases.] 
[FN2]: The Circuits have divided over when a judgment 
becomes final if a petitioner forgoes review in a State’s 
highest court. [Citations to several cases.] 
For a different and more subtle kind of example, consider Riley v. 
California, which concerned whether police may routinely search an 
arrestee’s cell phone without a warrant.18 The Database lists the case 
as “no reason given,” but a split of authority is logically discernible 
within the four corners of the decision: the Riley opinion actually 
decided two consolidated cases, and the Court’s opinion described 
the two lower courts as coming out on opposite sides of the question 
presented.19  
The number of facially apparent splits that are not captured by 
the Database’s coding probably varies from year to year.20 Among 
the last few Supreme Court terms, the 2010 Term may be especially 
notable: the Database coding shows twenty-five splits that year, but 
there are at least ten more cases that the Database does not show as 
splits but in which a split in authority is evident from the face of the 
opinions. These cases are listed in the Appendix – Table 1. To be 
clear, the “missing” splits are not always so obvious as they are in 
some of the examples shown above, in which splits are mentioned 
right next to the grant of certiorari. In some cases one has to look at 
other parts of the majority opinion or at a concurring or dissenting 
                                                                                                 
18 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). 
19 Compare id. at 2481 (stating that the California Court of Appeal upheld a warrantless 
search of a cellphone incident to arrest), with id. at 2482 (stating that the First Circuit in-
validated a similar search). 
20 In some cases, it is possible that the coding is simply an error. But there are too many 
cases for that to provide a full explanation. The protocol is just strict about listing conflicts 
as the reason for the grant. 
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opinion to find the evidence. (Here we are not even considering 
those other cases, discussed in the next section, in which there are 
splits that one cannot detect within the four corners of the opinions 
at all.) 
In short, although the Supreme Court Database’s strict coding 
rules for the certiorari variable are not inherently objectionable – 
just about any protocol is fine as long as one understands it – the 
Database is not a good tool for identifying cases that resolve con-
flicts, at least if one wants anything like comprehensiveness. Wheth-
er one needs a complete list depends, of course, on the aims of 
one’s study. Incompleteness is certainly a problem if one’s goal is to 
provide a precise accounting of how many splits the Court resolved 
in a given term or to produce a scorecard of how various circuits 
fared. Mere incompleteness is not necessarily a problem if one’s aim 
is instead to detect empirical regularities in a large-n study of multi-
ple years – though, as discussed in Part II.D, the possibility that the 
omitted observations are biased in various ways is a real concern.  
As a final comment about using the Supreme Court Database to 
identify splits, I should emphasize that the pertinent limitations of 
the Database and the limitations of studies of parallel review only 
partly overlap. Researchers in law and political science can and do 
rely on the Database coding to locate splits for purposes besides de-
riving measures of parallel review; depending on what those studies 
aim to do, the limitations of the Database will be problematic to 
greater or lesser degrees.21 At the same time, one can construct 
measures of parallel review that do not involve using the Database at 
all, and some researchers have done just that. But, as I show next, 
eschewing reliance on the Database hardly solves all of the problems. 
                                                                                                 
21 For studies using the Database to locate splits for purposes besides compiling measures of 
parallel review, see, e.g., Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and 
Percolation in the Lower Courts: An Optimal Stopping Model, 75 J. POL. 150, 164 (2013); Frank 
B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use and Signifi-
cance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 546 (2010); Lindquist & Klein, supra note 8, at 144. In 
these studies, the ultimate aim is typically not to catalogue the results of every circuit split, 
and so the underinclusiveness discussed above is less of a worry. But the existence of cer-
tain types of bias in the data, which is a risk addressed in Part II.D, could well be a prob-
lem, depending on the aims of the study. 
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C. Splits Not Revealed in the Supreme Court’s Opinions 
One can capture additional splits by actually examining the Su-
preme Court’s opinions to look for mentions of the lower courts, 
which is the approach taken in some other recent studies.22 In many 
cases, the information about a circuit split is readily locatable near 
the end of the section of the majority opinion setting forth the case’s 
procedural background. To be more exhaustive, one would need to 
examine other parts of the majority opinion and separate concur-
rences and dissents as well, as the evidence of a split is not always in 
the most obvious location.23 One can supplement visual skimming 
by searching the opinions for key words or terms such as “F.,” which 
will find citations to the Federal Reporter.24  
How many more cases will one find by examining the Supreme 
Court’s opinions? The number may fluctuate from year to year, and 
it will certainly depend on how closely one scrutinizes the opinions 
and how one defines the cases of interest. My examination of the 
Supreme Court’s opinions from the 2010 Term revealed numerous 
splits that the Supreme Court Database did not include, but even 
my augmented count of splits represents less than half of the Court’s 
docket for that year. Summers and Newman’s methodology in-
volved looking at the Court’s opinions, and they similarly reported, 
for the 2005 to 2010 Terms, that fewer than half of the cases reach-
ing the Supreme Court from the federal courts of appeals revealed 
                                                                                                 
22 This is the approach employed in Summers & Newman, supra note 3. See Supreme Court 
Project, www.hangley.com/Supreme_Court_Project/ (last visited May 24, 2014) (describ-
ing their method). Hansford used Westlaw to search opinions for key terms likely to occur 
when a split is mentioned (“conflict,” “division,” etc.). Hansford, supra note 3, at 1175. 
Going forward, Cummins and Aft (now joined by Cumby as a new co-author) will read the 
opinions rather than relying on the Supreme Court Database as they did in the first two 
installments of their study – a change for which I commend them.  
23 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2361 (2011) (not mentioning circuit 
split as the reason for granting certiorari but mentioning the division of authority shortly 
thereafter). Compare Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (stating that the 
Court granted certiorari “to resolve two questions,” but not citing conflicting decisions), 
with id. at 1417 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing the conflicting approaches of sever-
al courts of appeals).  
24 My own recent study of the Supreme Court’s handling of circuit splits combined ap-
proaches in this way. See Bruhl, supra note 8. 
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splits, which they defined broadly to include any case in which more 
than one circuit had addressed a question (even if those courts had 
not disagreed).25 Depending on one’s criteria and methods for defin-
ing and identifying splits, one might generate a somewhat higher 
count, but a figure in the ballpark of 50% still seems low, given 
what we know of the Court’s case-selection practices.26 The figure 
suggests that some splits are simply not being revealed anywhere in 
the Supreme Court’s opinions. 
Such “silent splits” do in fact exist. It is easy to discover instances 
in which the opinions are silent about conflict despite quite a long 
history of lower-court disagreement.27 No amount of scouring of the 
U.S. Reports will find these cases. If one remains within the four cor-
ners of the decisions, one will totally miss some non-trivial number 
of resolutions of circuit splits. This compromises our ability to meas-
ure many things, including how often the Court agrees with the ma-
jority of the lower courts, which lower courts fare best, and the like. 
D. Bias in the Omitted Data 
Possibly even more distressing, though, is not the fact of under-
counting but the risk of systematic bias in the omitted data. That is, 
the cases that a particular methodology misses might not be a ran-
                                                                                                 
25 Summers & Newman, supra note 3, at 2. 
26 See supra note 14. 
27 For a notable recent example, consider City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013), 
which concerned whether Chevron deference applies to an agency’s determinations of its 
own “jurisdiction.” That question had been dividing the lower courts for years, but the 
Court does not reveal this history. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 248 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (citing conflicting cases stretching back for decades), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1863 
(2013). Similarly, the decision in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011), which 
concerned the “cat’s paw” theory of liability for employment discrimination, did not reveal 
that virtually every circuit had weighed in on how to apply that theory under various anti-
discrimination statutes, that various tests had developed, etc. See Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 2010 WL 942803 at *7-9 (citing conflicting 
decisions from twelve circuits). There are many other examples of Supreme Court deci-
sions that do not hint at the longstanding conflict that preceded them, and the phenomenon 
is not new. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. 
CT. REV. 403, 436-37 (1996) (noting examples from the mid-1990s and linking the phe-
nomenon to the development of an aloof, “Olympian” Supreme Court); Wayne A. Logan, 
Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
1137, 1167 (2012) (noting this phenomenon in the context of Fourth Amendment law). 
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dom subset of all cases resolving circuit splits. Bias could arise, for 
instance, if the Justices differ in their habits regarding whether and 
how to present splits in the opinions they author. And, in fact, it 
seems that they do differ in that regard. Justice Scalia has traditional-
ly been especially likely not to mention the existence of a split even 
when one exists.28 Thus, if one captures splits by relying on the 
opinions themselves, any such sample of cases is likely to un-
derrepresent Scalia opinions.  
The skew is even more pronounced if one identifies splits only 
by relying on the Supreme Court Database because, as discussed 
above, its protocol for coding the reason certiorari was granted ap-
pears to be quite sensitive to how exactly the opinion’s author 
phrases the key language mentioning the grant. It is stunning to say, 
but the Database’s coding for the 2010 through 2013 Terms – four 
years of decisions – reveals a total of only three Scalia majority opin-
ions in which the grant of certiorari was motivated by conflict in the 
lower courts. Justice Sotomayor, by contrast, has eighteen opinions 
during those same years that are coded as involving splits. Any study 
of these years that uses the Database to identify splits will therefore 
include six times as many Sotomayor majority opinions as Scalia ma-
jority opinions. Other wide disparities include Chief Justice Roberts 
on the low side (five cases) and Justice Kagan on the high side (seven-
teen cases). Appendix – Table 2 provides the full results. To be sure, 
some of this variation may reflect the fact that the Justices are not 
assigned equal numbers of cases resolving splits,29 but some of the 
                                                                                                 
28 My assessment is based, in part, on my impression of things after having reviewed many 
cases. As illustrations, note that City of Arlington and Staub, discussed in the previous foot-
note, were both Scalia opinions. My observations about Justice Scalia’s stylistic tendencies 
accord with those of Arthur Hellman, who detected this pattern some years ago. Arthur D. 
Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of Intercircuit Conflicts, 63 
U. PITT. L. REV. 81, 149 (2001). To be clear, this is not to say that Justice Scalia never 
mentions circuit splits; for recent instances in which he did, see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1385 (2014); and United States v. Woods, 134 S. 
Ct. 557, 562 (2013). (The Database shows Woods as a conflict but not Lexmark, probably 
because the discussion of the conflicting circuit views in the latter was slightly separated 
from the sentence noting the grant of certiorari.) 
29 For example, one might expect that Justice Kagan, as the Court’s most junior member, 
gets more than her share of technical statutory cases that the Court hears only because the 
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variation simply reflects differences in the Justices’ writing styles.  
Whether the disparities just mentioned are a serious problem 
depends on the research question being studied, but it should be a 
matter of concern for many questions. To give just one example, if 
Justice Scalia tends not to disclose splits as a matter of writing style, 
and also tends not to give much weight to the views of lower courts 
as a matter of methodological principle,30 then those missing cases 
may feature lower agreement rates between the Supreme Court and 
the lower courts than one would find in the rest of the Court’s cases. 
Further, it may be that the Justices, or at least some of them on 
some occasions, reveal or obscure circuit splits selectively, so as 
better to bolster their opinions. That is, the authoring Justice (or his 
or her clerks) could, consciously or not, mention the split when the 
Court sides with the majority of the lower courts but remain silent 
otherwise. The presence of a dissent can act as a deterrent to self-
serving biases or outright manipulation, or at least draw attention to 
such behavior, though that would not work when the Court is unan-
imous. Here I concede that I lack solid proof of strategic revelation 
of splits, but one need not be extraordinarily cynical to appreciate 
that it is a psychologically plausible scenario. And like the “Scalia 
effect” mentioned above, it could easily lead to overstatements of 
the rate at which the Supreme Court agrees with lower courts. At 
the same time, one could probably come up with plausible opposing 
stories according to which the Supreme Court’s opinions could un-
derstate the rate of agreement.31 
                                                                                                 
question has created a deep divide in the lower courts. In contrast, Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Kennedy, by virtue of their respective roles as Chief Justice and frequently 
decisive “swing Justice,” may get a disproportionate share of the assignments in high-profile 
constitutional cases in which splits are less common (or at least less important in explaining 
the certiorari decision). 
30 That does seem to be the case. See, e.g., United States v. Tinklenberg, 131 S. Ct. 2007, 
2018 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Brogan v. 
United States, 522 U.S. 398, 407-08 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Bruhl, supra 
note 8, at 921 (discussing Justice Scalia’s aversion to giving weight to lower courts’ views). 
31 Consider this possibility: 1) Unanimous decisions are more common when the Supreme 
Court agrees with most of the lower courts than when it disagrees; and 2) unanimous 
decisions are less likely than other decisions to reveal the state of the law in the lower 
courts (because, perhaps, there is less need to bolster the opinion). If those propositions 
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E. Beyond the Four Corners 
It is not clear how best to identify all of the splits that are not re-
vealed in the Court’s decisions. One could read the certiorari peti-
tions, of course, but taking them at face value would likely lead to 
overinclusion, given that petitioners have a powerful incentive to 
claim a conflict whenever possible. As a check on that tendency, one 
could consult the brief opposing certiorari, the lower-court decision 
under review, amicus briefs (especially from the Solicitor General), 
and other sources to see whether they agree with the petitioner. For 
older cases, one might even consult the Justices’ papers to see 
whether a grant of certiorari was motivated by a split of authority or 
some other factor. The effort required to examine the briefing and 
other sources poses a severe problem for political scientists trying to 
conduct a large-n empirical study covering many years. The under-
taking is more feasible if one is aiming for a more nuanced treat-
ment of a smaller group of cases (say, a couple terms’ worth).  
Apart from the time required, there is the unfortunate fact that 
departing from the Supreme Court’s own characterizations multi-
plies the subjective judgments involved in identifying the genuine 
conflicts. A thorough examination of the many complexities of iden-
tifying conflicts was written by Arthur Hellman in connection with 
his painstaking research on circuit splits.32 In addition to examining 
the Court’s opinions to see whether they reported conflicts, he re-
viewed the certiorari briefing (including amicus briefs), the lower-
court decisions of which review was sought and, in some cases, ad-
ditional materials such as other lower-court decisions and secondary 
sources.33 It was a major undertaking and one that required – as 
                                                                                                 
are true, and if one makes certain further assumptions about the distribution of unanimous 
versus divided opinions and the rate at which each type of opinion reveals splits, the state 
of the law in the lower courts could be less likely to be mentioned when the Supreme 
Court agrees with most of the lower courts. 
32 Hellman, supra note 28. A previous, similarly massive effort was the NYU Supreme 
Court Project. See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme 
Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 704-709 (1984) (describ-
ing the Project). 
33 Hellman, supra note 28, at 101-17, 147-53. Hellman looked at cases in which the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, and he also looked at cases denied review to determine 
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Hellman repeatedly acknowledged – plenty of contestable judgment 
calls.34 (Hellman’s aim was to identify circuit conflicts rather than to 
count exactly how many courts lined up on each side of a split; the 
latter task involves even more effort and subjectivity, as we will dis-
cuss shortly.)  
How far one should go in an attempt to identify splits depends 
not just on the resources available but also, of course, on the goals 
of one’s study. If one is interested in how the Court presents itself, 
one would focus on the opinions. If one is interested in why the Su-
preme Court grants review, one would focus on the materials that 
are most certainly before the Court when it acts, namely the certio-
rari-stage briefing and the lower-court decision at issue.35 If one 
wants to know how well various circuits predict the Supreme 
Court’s ultimate decisions or whether the Supreme Court is provid-
ing enough guidance to the legal system at large, one might need to 
look further or look elsewhere entirely. 
III.!COMPLEXITIES*OF*COUNTING'CASES"
epending on the questions one hopes to answer, the next step 
after identifying the Supreme Court cases resolving conflicts 
might be the task of determining how the lower courts lined up on 
the question presented and which lower courts “won” and “lost.” 
That is the chore undertaken, for example, by the recent studies of 
circuit performance mentioned at the outset.36 
There are some threshold methodological choices here that can 
be answered by reflecting on the goals of one’s study. These include 
questions about which lower-court cases “count” – e.g., whether to 
include state supreme courts or only federal courts of appeals in 
                                                                                                 
how many of them presented conflicts. The first of those tasks is the more relevant one 
here, but he used similar methods for both inquiries. Id. at 145, 147. 
34 See, e.g., id. at 103, 108, 111-12, 113-16.  
35 See Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(i) (requiring the decision below to be included as an appendix to the 
petition for certiorari). Of course, the Court’s knowledge is by no means limited to the 
materials presented to it, especially given modern electronic legal research. 
36 See generally App. Rev. I, supra note 3; App. Rev. II, supra note 3; Hansford, supra note 3; 
Summers & Newman, supra note 3. 
D 
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one’s tallies, whether to include unpublished decisions, and so on.37  
Much more vexing is the actual counting of the cases on each 
side. (The Supreme Court Database, just to be clear, does not at-
tempt to do this even when it codes a case as resolving a split.) An 
accurate accounting of the size of a split is, like identifying the exist-
ence of a split, tougher than it seems. For one thing, even in those 
cases in which the Court actually refers to a split, sometimes it does 
not purport to fully document the split but instead writes something 
like “Compare, e.g., [case], with, e.g., [another case].” For instance, 
the Court’s opinion in Henderson v. United States38 cites the case being 
reviewed and only two other circuits in describing the split, but the 
Solicitor General’s brief in response to the petition for certiorari 
detailed a much broader split.39 As with the decision whether or not 
to reveal a split, it is plausible that Justices are more likely (whether 
consciously or not) to list more of the lower-court cases that agree 
with them than cases that disagree. 
Moreover, even when all of the conflicting cases appear to be 
laid out in the Court’s opinions, sometimes the Justices will disa-
gree over how to characterize a split. Consider, to pick one exam-
ple, Milner v. Department of the Navy.40 In this case, the majority in-
sisted that the case involved a roughly even division in the lower 
courts, while the dissent accused the majority of joining the wrong 
side of a very lopsided split.41 Which side should we believe?  
Given that the Court’s opinions offer only incomplete guidance 
on the breakdown of the lower courts, perhaps the researcher 
                                                                                                 
37 One’s choices on these matters can occasionally have striking results. For example, Perry v. 
New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012), is described by Cummins & Aft as a close split 
(three courts versus two) because they count only federal courts of appeals. App. Rev. II, 
supra note 3, at 47. Yet the two federal courts of appeals on the “minority” side of the split 
were joined by some nine state high courts. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 723 n.4. So, which is the 
minority and which is the majority? It depends on whether one is interested in evaluating 
the performance of the federal courts of appeals in particular (as Cummins and Aft are) or 
instead studying, more broadly, whether the Supreme Court sides with most lower courts.  
38 133 S. Ct. 1121 (2013). 
39 Compare id. at 1125, with Brief for the United States, Henderson v. United States, 2012 
WL 7069951 at *13-15 (citing various circuits). 
40 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011). 
41 Compare id. at 1268-69, with id. at 1274 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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should independently investigate the underlying case law landscape. 
Unfortunately, independent investigation would not get at the 
whole truth either. Going outside the opinions in order to attempt 
to determine the actual circuit lineups in a split introduces tremen-
dous complexity and subjectivity. The judgment calls include: 
whether certain cases truly conflict or are instead distinguishable, 
whether the allegedly conflicting rules are dicta or holdings, wheth-
er the lower courts involved in a split would still reach the same 
decisions today given intervening Supreme Court rulings, how to 
handle intra-circuit conflicts, how to handle alternate holdings, and 
so forth. Further, there is no clear stopping point once one departs 
the four corners of the opinions. Certiorari filings are not necessari-
ly comprehensive and trustworthy. Those petitioning for certiorari 
may exaggerate conflicts, while respondents minimize or recharac-
terize them.42 Filings by the Solicitor General are more reliable, 
when they exist, but they are not wholly without guile or agenda. 
Lower-court opinions often collect cases on either side of a split, 
but there is no guarantee that those counts are comprehensive or 
totally evenhanded either. Even the most scrupulous law clerk 
charged with putting together such a string cite would have to make 
all of the contestable judgment calls just mentioned. The press of 
time probably leads the clerks, sometimes, to rely on the litigants’ 
(less scrupulous) characterizations.43 In order to attempt to achieve 
                                                                                                 
42 Although Cummins and Aft generally do not consult extrinsic sources to find circuit 
breakdowns, they do examine the petitions for certiorari in a few instances. App. Rev. I, 
supra note 3, at 65 & n.41. If a petition for certiorari claims a conflict as the basis for re-
view and then the Supreme Court grants certiorari, it is reasonable to assume that the case 
was granted because of the asserted conflict. But it is a different matter to rely on the peti-
tion as a source of accurate counts of how exactly the lower courts divided, especially if the 
petition’s assertions are not corroborated by (relatively) more objective sources like the 
lower-court decision or the Solicitor General. A case that illustrates the risks is Rehberg v. 
Paulk, in which the Court’s opinion mentions a split but does not list the participating 
circuits or how they divided. 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). Cummins and Aft score the 
decision as a 3-7 split, App. Rev. II, supra note 3, at 48, apparently in reliance on the peti-
tion for certiorari. But the other briefing in the case does not present the case that way, 
and it is not clear which of the various sources one should believe. After spending some 
time researching the matter, I am still not sure of the truth. (Part of the difficulty involves 
the level of generality at which to view the question presented.) 
43 An interesting question, suggested to me by Dru Stevenson, concerns how a circuit split 
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a complete and accurate accounting, a researcher would have to 
investigate all of the legal questions independently, but even a dili-
gent investigation is by no means guaranteed to find an objective 
answer – indeed, the measurements may become more debatable 
the deeper one digs. 
Take Fowler v. United States44 as one illustration of the difficulties. 
That case concerned the interpretation of a witness-tampering stat-
ute making it a federal crime to kill a person in order to prevent a 
communication with federal law-enforcement officers about the 
commission of a federal offense.45 The question before the Court 
was what, if anything, the prosecution had to prove about the likeli-
hood that the victim actually would have communicated with federal 
officials.46 The majority opinion, by Justice Breyer, did not fully 
document the split of authority: it cited a couple of clearly conflicting 
circuit decisions, but then it added a “see also” citation to a few more, 
without offering a parenthetical attempting to characterize their 
holdings.47 Turning to the merits, the majority charted a middle 
course between an extreme pro-defendant interpretation advanced by 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence and an extreme pro-prosecution inter-
pretation favored by Justices Alito and Ginsburg in dissent.48 Justice 
Breyer’s majority opinion clearly departed from at least two circuits’ 
positions, but it is not exactly clear whether it was agreeing with the 
others. Having examined the assertions in the parties’ briefs (which 
are predictably conflicting) and the circuit decisions (some of which 
                                                                                                 
comes to be characterized in a certain way. Each actor in the system engages in some inde-
pendent research and evaluation of the state of the law, but each actor may also borrow 
from prior actors’ characterizations. That is, the Supreme Court’s description of a split 
might rely to a degree on how the certiorari briefing or the lower court presented the split, 
which might in turn depend in part on how the litigants presented the split in the court of 
appeals, and so forth. Cf. Pamela C. Corley, Paul M. Collins Jr. & Bryan Calvin, Lower 
Court Influence on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J. POL. 31 (2011) (showing, 
through the use of plagiarism-detection software, that the Supreme Court’s opinions often 
copy, with or without attribution, from the decision under review). 
44 131 S. Ct. 2045 (2011). 
45 Id. at 2048 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C)). 
46 Id. at 2048, 2050. 
47 Id. at 2048-49. 
48 See id. at 2050-51. 
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are opaque or internally inconsistent), I am not quite sure how to 
score this one – and I am not alone in finding it difficult, as the con-
flicting assessments of other researchers show.49  
Another discouraging example is Staub v. Proctor Hospital.50 Alt-
hough the case involved a question of employment discrimination 
law that nearly all of the lower courts had encountered, Justice Scal-
ia’s opinion for the Court does not reveal this complicated history.51 
One can seek information about the prior law in the briefs and 
elsewhere (though, again, finding the correct, complete, and impar-
tial truth of the matter is a different story). Yet it remains hard to be 
sure which side of the split (if any) prevailed in the Supreme Court. 
In part, that is because Justice Scalia’s opinion does not tell us about 
the different approaches or tell us which circuits are correct. But the 
nature of the question presented – namely, “the circumstances un-
der which an employer may be held liable for employment discrimi-
nation based on the discriminatory animus of an employee who in-
fluenced, but did not make, the ultimate employment decision”52 – 
is such that the answer does not lend itself to a binary these-circuits-
win-and-these-others-lose tally. We know that the Supreme Court 
rejected the approach of the court below, but it is not so clear what 
it actually endorsed. The more general lesson is that certain ques-
tions could be answered by the lower courts with every color of the 
rainbow, and yet the Supreme Court sometimes just tells us “not 
red or orange.”  
As the reader can by now probably imagine, many more exam-
ples of the difficulties of accurately tallying circuit splits could be 
brought forth. 
 
                                                                                                 
49 Cummins and Aft score the case as a victory for four circuits and a loss for two. App. Rev. 
I, supra note 3, at 75. Summers and Newman score the case as a loss for all six circuits 
because the Supreme Court did not expressly agree with either of the camps’ approaches. 
Supreme Court Project, supra note 22. 
50 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
51 Compare id. at 1189-90, with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Staub v. Proctor 
Hosp., 2010 WL 942807 at *7-9. 
52 131 S. Ct. at 1189. 
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CONCLUSION"
t this point the reader may well be convinced that counting 
circuit splits is complicated. Still, how much does all of this 
matter?  
It depends. The difficulty of achieving precision is certainly a 
problem if one is attempting to capture the universe of conflict cases 
and measure that universe accurately. Accordingly, we should be 
cautious about statements to the effect that a particular circuit had 
the best record in the Supreme Court for a given term and came out 
on the winning side in X% of the splits the Court resolved. For oth-
er purposes, some imprecision and undercounting is acceptable, as 
long as the limitations are made clear to the reader. More worri-
some, though, is the risk that the cases captured and then tallied are 
unrepresentative along certain dimensions. Justices differ in their 
writing styles, including their practices regarding whether and how 
they reveal splits in their opinions. All of the Justices, fallible hu-
mans as they are, have the incentive, and sometimes the opportuni-
ty, to reveal or obscure the state of the prior law selectively so as to 
make their decisions look most justified. In sum, although examin-
ing the phenomenon of parallel review is far more fruitful than 
simply calculating how often the Supreme Court affirms or reverses 
in the eighty or so particular cases on its merits docket, researchers 
and readers alike should exercise care lest they draw conclusions 
that are stronger than what the underlying methodology supports 
and what the nature of the enterprise allows. 
" "
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APPENDIX"
Table 1 
Ten cases from 2010 Term that are not coded as splits in the Supreme 
Court Database but in which a split is revealed on the face of the 
decision. Note: This list does not include cases in which the lower 
courts were described as unanimous, which the Database also does 
not capture; see note 9 and accompanying text for some examples 
of such cases. 
Case name/citation Location where split is 
revealed 
Database coding 
for cert. grant 
variable 
L.A. County, Cal. v. Humphries, 
131 S. Ct. 447 (2010) 
131 S. Ct at 450 (opinion 
of the Court) 
no reason given 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 
131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011) 
131 S. Ct. at 2636, 2640 
(opinion of the Court) 
to resolve question 
presented 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101 (2011) 
131 S. Ct. at 1106 (opin-
ion of the Court) 
no reason given 
Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara 
County, Cal., 131 S. Ct. 1342 
(2011) 
131 S. Ct. at 1347 (opin-
ion of the Court) 
no reason given 
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2355 (2011) 
131 S. Ct. at 2361 (opin-
ion of the Court) 
no reason given 
United States v. Tinklenberg, 131 
S. Ct. 2007 (2011) 
131 S. Ct. at 2014 (opin-
ion of the Court) 
to resolve question 
presented 
Freeman v. United States, 131 S. 
Ct. 2685 (2011) 
131 S. Ct. at 2698 (So-
tomayor concurrence) 
no reason given 
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. 
ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885 
(2011) 
131 S. Ct. at 1890 (opin-
ion of the Court) 
no reason given 
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 
1388 (2011) 
131 S. Ct. at 1417 (So-
tomayor dissent)  
to resolve question 
presented 
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 
2806 (2011) 
131 S. Ct. at 2816 (opin-
ion of the Court) 
no reason given 
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Table 2 
Cases from 2010 through 2013 Terms that are coded as conflicts by 
the Supreme Court Database’s “certReason” variable, disaggregated 
by Justice. As with the figures reported in the text accompanying 
footnote 13, these figures reflect the sum of “certReason” variable 
codes 2 through 9, which involve various types of splits or confusion 
in the lower courts. The figures are derived from the following ver-
sion of the database: 2014 Release 01, Case-centered/Citation-organized 
dataset (July 23, 2014), SUPREME COURT DATABASE, scdb.wustl.edu/ 
data.php. 
 Roberts Scalia Kennedy Thomas Ginsburg Breyer Alito Soto. Kagan Total 
OT2010 1 1 3 3 3 4 2 3 5 25 
OT2011 2 1 1 1 4 2 3 5 3 22 
OT2012 0 0 3 4 6 4 6 6 3 32 
OT2013 2 1 4 2 1 2 0 4 6 22* 
Total 5 3 11 10 14 12 11 18 17 101 
* This total for OT2013 does not include two cases that the Database codes as 
conflicts but with no authoring Justice listed. In both cases the Court’s decision 
was per curiam, though in one of these cases the Database apparently bases its cod-
ing on information in Justice Breyer’s dissent. Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, 
134 S. Ct. 594, 595 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the Court’s dismissal of 
the writ as improvidently granted). 
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